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Introduction: From the Evil Empire to the Evil Import
With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat is no longer a factor in our formu

lation of trade policywith Japan. In days past, the State Department cited geopolitical
concerns in its on-going battle with those sections of the government who were more

willing to slap trade restrictions on Japan for alleged unfair trading practices.1 Until the
early 1970s, United States trade policy was almost totally subjugated to winning the Cold
War; our market was thrown open to imports even if others were not. Back then, though,
this was not only a wise Cold War "military tactic," but it also made good economic sense.
Japan and Europe were so economically decimated by World War II, that we needed to

pull up their economies in order to have trading partners.2
The oil shortages and global slowdown in economic growth during the 1970s
changed these policies, however. From that point until the collapse of the Communist

bloc, trade relations between Japan and the United States grew increasingly tense.
Even former President Ronald Reagan, a vocal supporter of laissez-faire government,
slapped a 100% retaliatory tariff on $300 million worth of Japanese imports in 1987

because of an alleged violation of a 1986 semiconductor agreement.3
Mercantilism was abandoned by most economists in the 1700s, and most

economists assert that imports are the most important part of free trade.4 Public opinion
certainly does not always gel with "most economists," though. With the evil empire gone,
we seem to be focused on the evil import. It has often been mentioned that we may be

leaving the Cold War only to face a number of other international problems: many of

which will be caused by economic trends and international trade. These other problems
are certain to affect US/Japan trade policy.
The multilateral trading regime, known as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), finished its Uruguay Round in 1994. GATT is now known as the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The major objective of the WTO is to make world
trade freer by reducing trade barriers. One of the noteworthy aspects of multilateral

negotiations, though, has been the absence of any discussion of the benefits of imports.
Opening up one's market to the evil import was put forth as the supreme sacrifice, only to
be implemented if another market would make a similar sacrifice (i.e. open their market to

imports.)5 WTO members are quick to embrace the idea of increased exports, but not
necessarily of increased imports.

Besides the new WTO, other trade issues have affected US/Japan trade relations.

Among these issues are American unilateral action against Japan and bilateral negotiations
between the two countries. Since such negotiations will be heavily discussed in this paper,
all we need to mention here is that many people view bilateral negotiations and unilateral
actions as a threat to the multilateral trading regime (the WTO). However, I hope to
demonstrate in this paper that unilateral negotiations, threats, and retaliations, have

accomplished progress that the GATT could not have achieved alone.
Another important issue bearing on US/Japan trade relations is that geopolitical
concerns continue to be a part of trade relations, even though the Soviet threat is gone.

There are still a lot of spots around the world where military conflict could flare up (e.g.
the Middle East, China, Korea), so it is still immensely important that we stay on good

terms with Japan. Therefore, geopolitical concerns will, and certainly should, continue to
temper rash decisions to impose our own trade barriers against Japan. Not only that,
but just because the Soviet threat is gone does not mean that another threat will not rise

up to take its place; many people believe that China could be that threat. Since Japan has
such great historical, geographical, and political ties to China, this is another reason to

allow geopolitical considerations to figure into our foreign trade policy.
Finally, the Japanese economy is struggling. In 1994 and 1995 the Japanese
economy grew at an anemic 1% per year. In 1996 it seemed that the Japanese economy
was finally coming out of the doldrums when it grew 3%. However, it is estimated that

the economy will only grow at a rate just over 1% in 1997. The prolonged Japanese

recession ofthe early 1990s is forcing changes inthe Japanese system.6 It is the Japanese
system as it has been known that we begin with now.

1Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 135.
2Prestowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 131.
3The Political Economy ofAmerican Trade Policy, 1996, p. 11.
4Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 277.
5Trading Free, 1993, p. 23.
6Business Week, January 27, 1997, p. 27.

Chapter 1: Japanese Trade Practice
Many economists are so wedded to the free trade religion that whenever America
threatens retaliatory trade action, they accuse America of unfairly complaining. Further
more, many of these same economists will not believe that it can be beneficial to deviate
from the laissez-faire paradigm.

Overall, free trade is beneficial, but some government

intervention can also be beneficial. In Chapters 2 and 3, we will see that many elements of

American trade policy are unfair; and, when making policies to improve our economy we
should certainly place more emphasis on domestic policy than trade policy. However, as

this chapter will demonstrate, many aspects of Japanese trade policy are unfair to
American imports. The discussion cannot stop there, though, because Japanese trade
policies are detrimental to more than just American exporters. Much more importantly,

these policies are harmful to Japanese consumers, as well. This was even evident before
the current Japanese recession.
Japanese Capitalism

It can be hard to define why Japanese trade practice is unfair. During the 1980s it
was more common for people to believe that if the United States complained, we were

complaining unfairly. Today, though, many people may not be able to define why Japa
nese trade practice is unfair, but they believe that it is unfair. Hopefully, we will be able to
define Japanese trade policy in more exact terms, and a good place to start is with a
description of their system of capitalism.
The economies of Japan, and South Korea and Taiwan for that matter, have used

protectionism to positively develop their own economies. Free trade, as Americans would

define the term, can be an alien concept to them.1 The basic theory of free trade, David
Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, states that countries will produce what they
are relatively better at producing. And, of course, the logical extension is that they will

import those products which they are relatively less able to produce. Japan, on the other

hand, sees comparative advantage as something to be conquered and developed.2 Carried
to an extreme, this policy could justify using the infant industry argument in every part of
the economy. Any product that Japan is less able to produce now, could be turned into a
comparative advantage if they protect it long enough.
Another basic difference is that American economics is geared towards maximi
zing consumer welfare. This is evident in our strict antitrust laws. However, the

Japanese system is geared towards producer welfare. Japan is not naturally wealthy

because of its poor resource endowment. History has also played a role in Japan's
producer welfare orientation. Ever sincethe Meiji Restoration, Japan has attempted to
raise its economy up to the modern level of the rich Western countries. After World War

II, Japan's economy was devastated. The focus further shifted to producers who, it was

believed, were most able to repair the country.3
For these reasons, economics is viewed as a matter of national security to many
Japanese citizens. All elements of Japanese society are geared towards economic

progress, from the workers on up to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) and other prominent governmental agencies. Conflict arises because policies that

the United States views as protectionist are seen by Japan as its only way to survive as a
first-class nation.4

High-technology industries have intensified and highlighted national differences in
the models of capitalism. Since high-tech advantage can be created rather than inherited,

as some would argue, conflict has focused on the way a country creates its advantage. In
the past, trade conflicts were focused on border policies such as tariffs slapped on

imported goods. GATT has been successful in eliminating most such barriers, especially
among developed countries. The only noticeable tariffs that remain are on agricultural

products because of the political power of farmers.5
Unfortunately, international trade negotiations have become more complex. Areas
of trade negotiations which were once off-limits because they were considered the nation-

state's sovereign choice are now exactly those issues which generate so much conflict.6
Now we turn to many of these issues as we look at an area called competition policy.
Competition Policy

Tariffs, and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas are well-known barriers to
free trade. Japan employs few tariffs or NTBs so it can be difficult to pin down their
unfair trading practices. However, several new areas of trade law have arisen in recent

years, including intellectual property rights, labor standards, environmental standards, and

competition law. Some of these standards are so new they have not even been codified;
or, if they have, the process has just begun. Competition law falls into this category. In
Chapters 2 and 3 we will see how competition policy affects multilateral and bilateral

negotiations. Now, though, we need to define competition law because it goes a long way
towards explaining America's concern over the openness of Japan's market.

Collins and Bosworth define the problem of competition policy nicely. "The
biggest trade friction problems have been arising in recent years and will continueto arise
over issues of competition [which are] cartel-like activities; non-competitive business
practices; informal arrangements between governments and companies; closed distribution

systems; all of the so-called non-tariffbarriers that have been so much in dispute over the
past ten or fifteen years. Most of these do not fall under the rules of the new WTO."7

This is exactly why dealing with Japan in the area of trade can be so frustrating.
I'd like to deal with each of these issues in turn. To begin with, cartel-like activi

ties are very rare in the United States. Such activities are an excellent example of the

difference between the two forms of capitalism. Since the United States economic system
is geared towards consumer benefit, the United States's strict antitrust laws would prevent
cartelization among industries. In Japan, explicit or implicit cartels are not only informally

approved, they are often encouraged.8
There are also informal arrangements between governments and companies to

keep out foreign competitors. The soda ash case is a good illustration of this problem.
The production of soda ash is expensive and energy intensive. Soda ash occurs naturally
in America, and it can be mined for $75 per ton or less. Despitethis cost advantage the
United States exported a mere 60,000 of the 1.4 million tons of soda ash used in Japan.

The unloading charge for soda ash in prominent ports, such as Antwerp or Cape Town,
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was $20 per ton. Japan charged $50-$75 per ton at its one unloading facility, the Toko

Terminal owned by a consortium of Japan's soda ash manufacturers and large trading
companies.

Inevitably, the United States complained about this unfair treatment. Our com

plaints were met by Japanese officials' claims that we were not trying hard enough, that
we provided unreliable service, and that we produced a poor quality product. Eventually,

some changes were made and sales increased to 200,000 tons per year.9
The soda ash case is an example of how elements of the Japanese business sector

can work in tandem to prevent Japanese exports in more subtle ways than implementing
non-tariffbarriers such as quotas. The Kansai case is an example of how informal

government practices can also limit imports. Here, the activities are restricting a service
(construction), rather than a manufactured product.
Kansai was an airport that Japan was building. Japan did not allow American firms

to bid on the construction of some parts of the airport. In order for foreigners to bid on

those sections that were opened up to foreign bidding, they had to have experience in
construction projects in Japan. Of course, this was experience that US firms did not have

because they had been kept out of other Japanese construction projects.10
Perhaps the most well-known of Japan's informal trade barriers, is the unfair

treatment of US products in the distribution system. The ties between Japan's domestic

producers and retailers run deep and have heavy social obligations.11 The difference be
tween this arrangement and the United States distribution system could not be more

striking. For example, if an American manufacturer pressured dealers not to sell Japanese

cars, that manufacturer could be put in jail. In Japan such pressure against American made

cars is commonplace.12 The Japanese place a lot ofemphasis on preserving long-term
relationships. This is also true in the producer-retailer relationships. The end result is that
foreign firms simply do not offer the benefitsthat local producers do. How can a

multilateral trade organization regulate the fact that Japanese producers pressure retailers

to sell their own products?13
In 1994 about 51% of Japan's 1.5 million retailers were classic "mom-and-pop"

stores operated by one or two people.14 Large retail stores are discouraged in Japan for a
number of reasons. First of all, large retail stores could circumvent the ties between

producers and retailers we just discussed in the previous paragraph. Because of their size,

they are not dependent on wholesalers who are, in turn, dependent on manufacturers.15
This is especially important in Japan, where it is common for products to pass through
three or four wholesalers before being sold at a retail store. In the United States products
usually pass through one wholesaler, while in Europe products usually pass through one

or two wholesalers.16 An important result ofthis practice is that the small stores are more
dependent on local (i.e. Japanese) producers. And, as you may have guessed, large
retailers would have more freedom to sell imported products.
A second, and, political reason for maintaining a large number of small stores is

that the distribution sector has served as a shock absorber for high unemployment. The
small shopkeepers are numerous and politically powerful. It is in their best interest to

prevent the emergence of large retail stores that could put them out of business.17

10

A third reason is that the government, as we have already seen, emphasizes
production over consumption. The Japanese government works to keep consumption low
to encourage a high savings rate and to make production available for exports. What
better way to keep consumption low then to prevent large retail stores which encourage
spending.

The Large-Scale Retail Store Law, enacted in 1974, put in place numerous
bureaucratic hurdles for business people wishing to start a large retail establishment. This

law was the codification of the Japanese government's policy of keeping out large retailers
in favor of "mom-and-pop" stores. Fortunately for Japanese consumers and American

exporters, this law is being relaxed. For instance, Toys R Us opened its first store in Japan
in January 1991 to great media fanfare. Twenty-nine more ToysR Us stores were
scheduled to open by late 1995. Other relaxations of legal restrictions have included

allowing longer store hours and limiting the wait between application for a large store and
approval of the project. Japan is likely to experience an increase in mergers of small and
medium sized stores and the construction of more large retail establishments. This should

drive down prices which would, in turn, improve the welfare of Japanese consumers.18
One final point which should be made before leaving this section is that many trade
watchers argue that we simply need to try harder. Naturally, a country must try harder to
establish itself in a foreign market. Many American companies have made mistakes in

their attempts to market products in Japan. They may use American, rather than Japanese
lettering; or, they may improperly re-engineer a car that must have the steering wheel on

the right side. Despite these examples, though, the Japanese market is inordinately
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difficult to penetrate. No one accuses Hong Kong or Taiwan of being poor traders, but

they have just as much trouble as we do in penetrating the Japanese market.21 The "Made
in Hong Kong" or "Made in Taiwan" labels are common in the United States, but
relatively rarer in Japan.

Elements of unfairness in the Japanese economy lie on a spectrum. The fact that

Japanese consumers are less likely to purchase foreign elements may justify the argument

that we should try harder. The fact that members of the gaiatsu purchase from each other

is a little harder to justify. And the fact that the Japanese government keeps foreign firms
from bidding on non-military government contracts is hardest of all to justify.
To justify their argument that foreigners are not trying hard enough, critics may

point to success stories. For instance, Citibank has done quite well in Japan. However,

the role of foreign banks actually declined in the 1980s, and foreign banks account for only
2% of deposits. It may be that the Japanese government "allowed" Citibank to do well so

they could have a foreign success story.19 This may seem like a cynical interpretation, but
the Japanese government has bought off foreign pressure in other markets by allowing one

firm to do well inthe Japanese oligopoly.20
Intra-Industry Trade

The preceding discussion of Japan's alleged unfair competition policy begs an
obvious question: Are these practices reflected in the trade statistics? The theory of intraindustrytrade, or trade in similar manufactured products, helps answer this question.
A discussion of Japan's balance of trade is not as straight forward as it was a mere
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two years ago. As recently as 1994 it would have been difficult to defend Japan's balance
of trade, but the Japanese economy is slowly changing and becoming more open to foreign
exports.

It is unlikely that Japan will ever have a trade deficit in manufactured products

because they are forced to import so many raw materials due to their poor resource

endowment. Even if we take this into consideration, Japan demonstrated many strange
patterns of trade during the 1980s. It was the only major country to experience a decline

in the ratio of total imports to GDP, and it was the only industrialized country to run large

trade surpluses with theLittle Tigers inEast Asia.22 When Edward J. Lincoln analyzed
Japan's trade, he used several measurements and held different relevant variables constant.
For example, he examined a study by Kazuo Sato which assumed that larger population
bases (like Japan) import less, and considered the extensive intra-EU trading in Europe.
His conclusion was blunt: "Any way the question is posed, Japan turns out to be different.
Its pattern of behavior is seriously at odds with all the expectations generated by intra-

industry trade theory."23 In 1995, though, Japanese imports of manufactured products
nearly doubled from just over $100 billion to almost $200 billion. Hopefully, this signifies

that change is afoot.24
Japanese Consumers

As I have hinted at earlier, the Japanese consumer has suffered because of
Japanese trade practices. This is one of many reasons that Japanese trade policies do not
only hurt American exporters. In some ways, their practices do harm our producers. But

the affect on Japanese consumers has been much more devastating.
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Edward J. Lincoln, paints a dark picture indeed of the plight of the Japanese con
sumer in his work Japan's Unequal Trade. He explains that the Japanese standard of
living continues to lag behind other industrialized nations for many reasons. The incessant
emphasis on manufactured exports is a main cause of this. Low productivity in agriculture
and services, and deficiencies in basic elements of social infrastructure have been a conse

quence of Japan's blind emphasis on manufactured exports. Moreover, Japan has contin

ued to expand exports despite a prohibitively strong yen.25
Governmental policies to keep consumption low have also affected the Japanese

consumer. Tax and land-use rules restrict housing space.26 These same laws also inflate
urban land prices, forcing citizens into cramped dwellings where few consumer durables

can fit.27 The situation is so bad that a college graduate's anticipated life earnings will
barely pay for one of these cramped one-room apartments in Tokyo. The average worker

has a three to four hour commute because living space inthe city is so expensive.28
Furthermore, according to some estimates, Japanese men work an average 2617 hours per

year and Japanese women work an average 2409 hours per year; American workers

average 1943 hours per year.29
The Japanese worker suffers in other ways for the Japanese production behemoth.
One reason that Japanese exports are so successful is because of its low prices. This is

accomplished, in part, by holding worker's wages below the productivity increases which
should raise their salaries. It is further accomplished by imposing harsh demands on

intensely loyal, but dependent and vulnerable subcontractors.30
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These subcontractors demonstrate the two-tier society prevalent in Japan. The

large multinational corporations have been successful, but these subcontractors represent
the dark underbelly of the Japanese economic machine. In fact, one of the reasons that the
average hours worked per year is so high is that small and medium sized enterprises (often
these very same subcontractors) are not covered by the Labor Standards Law which sets
maximum hours. Yet, two-thirds of Japanese employees work in small-to-medium sized

firms.31 It is no wonder that Japanese workers are more dissatisfied with wages and
general working conditions than US, British, German, Australian, or Singaporean

employees.32
To add insult to injury, the environment in which the average Japanese citizen
works and lives is outwardly opulent. Gavan McCormack, in his 1996 work entitled, very
accurately, The Emptiness ofJapanese Influence, describes Kobe before the earthquake as
"a city exclusively devoted to convenience and economic efficiency [which] betrayed the

interests of its citizens and sacrificed its weak and poor."33 Mr. McCormack, a few pages
later, quotes Morita Akio, Chairman of Sony as saying, "Until Japan proved ready to
redefine itself, it cannot hope to be accepted on the same stage as Europe and North

America."34 The recently coined termfukoku hinmin (Enrich the country, impoverish the
people) symbolizes this development.35
Following World War II, as we have seen, the Japanese people worked in concert
to rebuild its war-ravaged economy. It is unlikely that this generation, or subsequent

generations, of Japanese will continue to sacrifice in this manner for their country. Recent
developments in the behavior of Japanese consumers demonstrate that change is coming.
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In the past the Japanese consumer was kept in the dark about imports; consumer
behavior represented this. The Japanese term for imported products was hakuraihin,

meaning "goods that come by ship." These imports, which were usually displayed with a
flag or sticker to signifythat they are different, were seen by consumers as exotic products

coming from far away.36
Western economists still think of Japanese consumers and producers reacting to

supply/demand conditions. This is always modified by existing social norms.37 Not only
that, but Japanese consumers often assume locally produced goods are better than

equivalent foreign products. And these equivalent foreign products are quick to appear.
Whenever a foreign product attracts a Japanese audience, local companies are quick to

duplicate it with additions that will attract the Japanese consumer.38 Once again, the
question this brings up is should this be regulated by a multilateral trading order?
Hopefully, in time, this question will never need to be answered because Japanese
consumption practices are starting to change.

Japanese consumers are Westernizing in that they buy rooms with tables and chairs
rather than tatami mats, and they are buying bread, blue jeans, hamburgers, etc. In other

words, their tastes are becoming more cosmopolitan.39 As the Japanese consumers' tastes
have changed, so have their spending practices. Because of the trade practices described
earlier, the prices of products in Japanese stores are very expensive. Japanese travelers
stand out overseas because of their heavy purchasing. That is because these products can
be purchased cheaper abroad, even Japanese products.
An increasingly noticeable example of this trend is the increase in the use of over-
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seas mail-order catalogs. One mail-order company said that they started their business
after hearing many Japanese employees say that they would like to purchase the highquality products they saw while traveling abroad as easily as they are able to purchase

domestic products.40

Tyler, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 34.

2Prestowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 123.
3Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 182.
4Prestowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 123.
5Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, pp. 261, 263.
6Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries, 1992, 18.
7The New GATT, 1994, p. 79.
8Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 100.
9Prestowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 124.
10 Regulating Unfair Trade, 1993, p. 82.
11 Japan 's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 93.
12 Prestowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 129.
13 Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 181.
14 Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 19, 1996, p. 70.
15 Japan 's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 124.
16 Journal ofConsumer Policy, Vol. 19, 1996, p. 71.
17 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 130
18 Journal of Consumer Policy, Vol. 19, 1996, pp. 73, 75, 80.
19 Prestowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1993, p. 128.
20 Reconcilable Differences: United States-Japan Economic Conflict, 1993, p. 170.
21 Ibid, p. 190.
22 Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 181.
23 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 60.
24 Web site: http://www.jetro.go.jp/FACTS/UA-HANDBOOK/13.html
25 Japan 's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 10.
26 Ibid.

27 Regulating Unfair Trade, 1993, p. 25.
28 The Emptiness ofJapanese Influence, 1996, p. 79.
29 Bid, p. 80.
30 Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 183.
31 The Emptiness ofJapanese Influence, 1996, p. 80
32 Bid, p. 85.
33 Bid, p. 79.
MBid, p. 82.
35 Bid, p. 106.
36 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 80; and, Wolfowitz, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 134.
37 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 100.
38 The New Protectionist Wave, 1990, p. 91.
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39 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 85.
40 Focus Japan, November 1996, pp. 1-2.
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Chapter 2: The American Response Under the WTO
If the United States believes that Japanese trade policy is unfair, it can, basically,
react in one of two ways. It can either act within the multilateral trading regime, or it can

act outside of it by acting alone or only with Japan. This chapters will examine the former
choice, while the next chapter will examine the latter choice. The multilateral trading
order is organized under the World Trade Organization (WTO), formerly the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). We will look at the WTO first because we will
examine the pros and cons of acting outside of the multilateral trading order in the next
chapter.
The WTO

The United States has been very successful in leading the policy making direction
of the GATT. As the largest and most influential economy since the end of World War II,

other countries have followed the behavior of the United States in the multilateral trading
order. As Patrick Low says in TradingFree, "[I]f the United States chooses a route

different from multilateralism, the world will not be far behind."1
The current struggles of the WTO have caused some people to imagine a golden
age of GATT that never really existed. The GATT has always been a struggle. The
problem now is that the issues are more complex. The first ever meeting of GATT, which
took place in 1947, mainly focused on tariff reduction. This was a struggle, but it was
successful. In the United States tariff rates fell from 54% in 1930 to 12% in 1983. Then,

starting in 1978 with the Tokyo Round of GATT, non-tariff barriers became a focus of

trade talks. This has been a struggle, but has also led to a worldwide reduction inNTBs.2
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The Uruguay Round was a struggle to finalize, and the agreement reached will be
a struggle to implement for several reasons. To begin with, the Uruguay Round of GATT
dealt with a wide array of issues with which the GATT has never had to contend. The

Uruguay Round implemented a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This is
an issue the United States wanted to see put on the table, and the US was successful in
seeing it implemented. The GATS is similar to GATT because it does not move to free
trade in services, but will start the world down the path of freer trade in services. Another

new issue dealt with in the Uruguay Round of GATT was intellectual property (IP)
protection. Unlike the GATT or the GATS, the Trade Related Aspects of IP Rights

(TRIPs), achieved a minimum standard of harmonization.3 The new WTO also includes a
more powerful dispute resolution process. Many trade watchers, though, believe that the
dispute settlement process was designed to be drawn out so that the sides could reach a
settlement on their own.4

These issues are not as straight forward as tariff or NTB reduction. The TRIPs is

especially noteworthy because US IP law is very different from other countries. True,

America's ability to negotiate a multilateral agreement in an area where there are so many
differences among countries demonstrates the influence the United States has over the

GATT. However, these differences are likely to be a source of heated conflict.5
It will be interesting to see how effective the GATS and TRIPs are in dealing with
their respective issues because there are so many issues with which the WTO could still

take up. The WTO could deal with wage scales, worker's rights, working conditions,
exchange rates, environmental controls, tax codes, banking regulations, ad infinitum.

20

Where should the WTO draw the line? Should the WTO begin negotiations on compe

tition policy?6
Japan and the WTO

Japan presents several unique difficulties for the United States in multilateral

negotiations. The structure of the Japanese government and business sectors are very
different from the United States. Some people believe that the Japanese government has a
central organ; this is not true. The Japanese government is actually a balancing act

between semiautonomous groups who share power. These include certain political

groups, powerful bureaucrats, and industrialists.7
The economic sector is also different for two reasons. One is the two-tiered

economy consisting of low wage and dependent subcontractors, and the large multi
national corporations for whom these subcontractors work. The other major difference is

the keiretsu relationship. The keiretsu relationship, or enterprise group, is defined nicely
by Ozaki.

The enterprisegroup consists of a major bank, a major trading company,
and a major manufacturing firm as the central core of the group, and of
several large manufacturing firms in different product lines, below which
lie pyramids of affiliated smaller subcontracting firms.
There are elements of cooperation among the keiretsu group which would be illegal in the
United States. The best known, and perhaps most important, is cross-ownership of stock.
For instance, a bank may own a large amount of stock in a company in its enterprise
group. This is done so that the bank has a defined interest in the company to which it
loans money. In the United States under the Glass-Steagle Act, it is illegal for banks to
own stock.8

21

Of course, the differences between Japan and the United States are not limited to

this. History, geography, resource endowment and everything else that goes into the
development of a nation-state have created differences between the two countries.

Perhaps this is what prompted John M. Culbertson to write that "national differences in
circumstances, ideologies, and administrative capabilities, and other factors are too

important to permit any uniform and general system for arranging international trade."9
Competition policy (or antitrust rules) have not been formally dealt with by the
WTO, but this will not prevent it from being a source of conflict. If (more likely when)

there are competition policy negotiations, the negotiations will be very delicate. The

question which will loom over the negotiations will be which Japanese practices are unfair,
and which simply represent a fair, and welfare-increasing, element of the Japanese system
of which Japan has every right to protest the removal. Many of these are simply an

offshoot of the Japanese system of capitalism. For instance, Japanese companies are able
to sell below cost for a time because of the keiretsu relationship. A company earning

temporary losses in one market can be offset by profits in another sector ofthe keiretsu1
Should this be considered a violation of antitrust or simply effective capitalism? There

certainly is not as much consensus on the answer to this question as there is to whether
quotas or tariffs should be reduced.

The Uruguay Round of GATT was successful in eliminating most tariffs on goods
and setting up a mediation system. However, the United States, Japan, and Europe cannot
decide where to take the WTO next, and whether this next step should include

deliberations on competition policy. Japan is unlikely to agree to such a step. They have
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always wanted the multilateral trading system to only focus on manufactured goods.
Given Japan's balance of trade and economic system, this is not surprising. Japan would
like foreign markets to be more open for its export machine, but Japan is dead last among
industrialized nations in trade in services.12
The United States and the WTO

Despite the many problems with the WTO, the United States and the rest of the
world have much to gain from a successful multilateral trading order. Negotiations began
in 1984 to begin a new round of GATT talks in part because it was estimated that global

welfare would increase by $250 billion (1% of world GDP).13 And, aswe have seen, there
were many new, emerging issues with which the WTO could still take up. It may appear
that it is bad news for the multilateral trading order that these new issues have arisen.

Nothing could be further from reality. It is true that these new issues will make
negotiations more complex and, possibly, less successful. These new issues arose,
however, because of the vast increase in international trade; it was inevitable that new
issues would arise as the world economies became more intertwined.

In spite of these potential gains from trade, the WTO is experiencing many

problems. Many international political observers believe that a multilateral trading system
can only survive with a hegemon. This theory proposes that a hegemon is necessary to

produce the public goods and set the example for the rest of the world. As we discussed
earlier, the United States was willing to open its market to imports during the Cold War
even when other countries were not willing to do so. This occurred for many reasons, not
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the least of which was that we were so economically strong that we could afford to wait

on other countries to open up their markets.14
Clearly, the United States is still the leader of the world economic community. Is
its position still strong enough to permit it to play the role of hegemon? If it is not, then

Japan's role in the multilateral trading order will be a critical one. So far, though, Japan
has not shown much interest in exercising political influence commensurate with its

economic power. Moreover, Japan has never been particularly active in the GATT
system. Some have gone so far as to argue that, for the most part, Japan considers its
multilateral trading activity to be a necessary evil to improve its image in the inter

national community.15
The United States has had its problems with free trade, as well. Since, constitu

tionally, Congress can override the US's WTO responsibilities, the impact that the WTO
has on the United States will depend on the reactions of those in the trade war trenches:

Congress, Courts, trade lawyers, and administrative agencies.16
As we have seen the WTO gave teeth to the dispute resolution agreement of the
multilateral trading order. If history is a guide, there may be trouble brewing, US agencies
openly defied many decisions of US/Canadian panels in deciding trade disputes under the

US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (the precursor of NAFTA).17
At the risk of sounding redundant, the United States is better off with the multi

lateral trading order. Despite the hand-wringing about the threat of imports, our eco

nomic welfare is improved by keeping trade as free as possible. There is great political

pressure in this country to protect threatened industries, even if such protection wjJJ
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decrease total economic welfare. The WTO permits politicians to resist these pressures by
pointing to their duty under the multilateral trading order.

Foreign competition also forces domestic companies to improve efficiency. And, if
a country has a comparative advantage in the production of an input, domestic companies
will be better off purchasing the input from the cheapest source. Nonetheless, it may be
necessary to act bilaterally to open a market that is closed. The libertarian argument that
we are better off with an open market even if other countries' markets are closed to our

exports is not very popular, and it is certainly debatable. It is the argument over whether
to use bilateral and unilateral negotiations that we turn to in Chapter 3.

1Trading Free, 1993, p. 140.
2Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 261.
3The New GATT, 1994, p. 110.
4Business Week, June 5, 1995, p. 35.
5The New GATT, 1994, p. 107.
6Regulating Unfair Trade, 1993, p. 135.
7van Wolferen, in. Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 110.
8Human Capitalism, 1991, p. 53.
9Culbertson, in Free Trade vs. Protectionism, 1988, p. 66.
10 Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries, 1992, p. 81.
11 Business Week, December 16, 1996, p. 50.
12 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, p. 136.
13'.Fundamentals of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1996, p. 266.
14 Trading Free, 1993, p. 18
15 Bid, p. 246.
16 Journal of World Trade, June 1996, p. 64.
17 Bid, p. 67.
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CHAPTER 3: Bilateral Trade Action with Japan
It is important to remember that the trade conflict we are experiencing with Japan
is not new. Since hindsight is 20/20 we can learn several lessons from previous trade re
sponses. The high tariffs we imposed on Japan in the 1930s caused a fear and resentment

still felt today.l We should note our successes and mistakes when dealing with other
countries, as well. South Korea is especially noteworthy in this respect. Both Korea and

Japan have poor resource endowment, abundant labor, and strong entrepreneurship.2
When we retaliated against Korean color TVs in 1984, the shock to the Korean

government, industry, and public, who considered the US a key ally, is similar to the
reaction we get from Japan, who also considers us a key ally.
The Politics of Trade Policy
No trade policy decision we make, or choose not to make, occurs in a vacuum.

As mentioned earlier, government organizations such as the State Department and the
National Security Counsel are more concerned about global tranquillity than domestic
jobs. There is no reason that this should not be a factor to consider when we formulate

our national trade policy.3 We should not be upset that our trade policy is not precise.
There are so many factors to consider, and there are no absolute truths.4
It is unfortunate, though, when politics get in the way of wise trade policy. Trade

ceased to be a partisan issue a long time ago. Economic conditions are the best predictor
of how a member of Congress will vote on a certain issue. For instance, if a Congress

man lives in an affluent district where a high-tech export is important, that Congressman is
very unlikely to support policies which would likely anger foreign countries. On the other
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hand, if a member of Congress represents a district which produces an import sensitive
product such as textiles, that representative is much more likely to support policies which

are intended to protect the workers in that industry.5
Another reason that politicians often make economically unwise decisions is that

appearing tough on trade can improve one's chance at reelection. First of all, low-growth
sectors often suffer visibly because of layoffs and business losses in the industry. Obvi
ously, this may have less to do with unfair trade, and more to do with a weak industry, or

loss of comparative advantage. To be blunt, competition can be a scary thing. The first
chairman of the US Tariff Commission once said that 'Competition of any sort is unwel
come enough; competition from foreigners seems always to be regarded with particular
dread."6

Of course, there are times when an industry comes back, and the protection earned
by the representative helped that to happen. This is the essence of our representative
democracy. However, if it seems that an industry representative is one of the only

Congressmen pressuring for protection, we should only grant that protection after a very
careful consideration of the facts.

This, in part, explains the protection of the automobile industry in the early 1980s.
By early 1980 members of Congress recognized that auto industry distress had wide
appeal as a political issue. There were a lot of autoworkers, and the perception was that
their struggles were caused by unfair trade. Traditionally, Congress has been more

protectionist than the President. Thus, in 1984 when President Reagan ceded trade policy
power to Congress because of his own interest in tax relief and fighting communism, the
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die was cast. A voluntary export restraint (VER) was negotiated in 1984 despite sharply

increased prices and large executive bonuses.7
Another reason that politicians have made some unwise economic decisions is that

we have, unfortunately, a squeaky wheel policy. The industry that complains the loudest
has gotten the most attention. In our representative democracy, those groups which

organize most effectively are bound to receive the most attention.8 For instance, in the
debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), many agricultural
groups were harmed because of regional and commodity divisions. The sugar industry,

however, was united and achieved a high level of protection.9
Protectionism has been blunted in this country because of an underlying broad
support for free trade. This has been a critical counter to organized pressure groups.
A Democratic Congressman from North Dakota, Byron L. Durgan, said it is still

considered "almost a shameful thing to be labeled a protectionist."10 It was this broad
underlying support for free trade which helped NAFTA pass. As of 1997, America was
experiencing prosperous economic times. When we have another recession, it is inevitable

that protectionist sentiment will grow with the unemployment rate. But, hopefully, longterm support for free trade will continue.

There are some advantages to the inherently political aspects of our trade policy.

It may be inevitablethat there will be some protectionism. For the most part Congress
leaves trade policy decision making to the executive branch. Occasionally, though, it may

be necessary to buy off opposition to free trade in general with a few particular

exceptions.11 However, many economists believe that protection often postpones the loss
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ofjobs. Or, the added profits may increase executive bonuses rather than protecting jobs.

If so, this argument is weakened.12
Another advantage of bilateralism is that it may help open up Japanese markets
when the WTO will not. The European Union EU has gone to the WTO more often than
the United States, which has often dealt with lack of reciprocity to Japanese markets

through bilateral negotiations.13 These bilateral talks allow the United States to appear
tough to appease those groups interested in protection. It has been common practice
during these talks to use a "good cop/bad cop" strategy. Congress, the bad cop,
threatens to impose tough trade sanctions. Then, the good cop, the agency with which
Japan actually cuts a deal, prevents Congress from carrying through with its threats.

In this way, Congress knows it can talk tough without its policies being carried out.
This is an inherently dangerous game since it may cause Japan to feel ill-will toward us,
and poison the multilateral atmosphere. So far, we have been fortunate that a trade war

has not broken out. It is for this reason that US negotiators bark louder than they bite.
We may sacrifice quick, timely responses, but we have also prevented the onset of a trade
14

war.

When we looked at Japan's balance and terms of trade, we saw that Japan runs
unusually large surpluses in intra-industry trade. When making unilateral threats, the
United States does not run as high of a risk as Japan. Japan exports durable consumer
goods with a high elasticity of demand. If Japan employs counterretaliatory protectionist
measures that start a trade war, Japan has a lot to lose. The high elasticity of demand

means that increases in prices will have a large impact on their export sales. Also, Japan
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simply does not import as much as other countries. For example, in 1987 Japan exported
6.3 million of the 12.2 million cars it produced. However, they imported a mere onehundred thousand cars. The math is simple. A trade war involving vehicles would affect

6.3 million Japanese units, and a mere hundred thousand foreign units.15
Trade Policy Choices

United States trade policy is basically a waiting game; when an industry complains
about alleged unfair trade, the government reacts. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act

gave private parties the right to initiate complaint proceedings. This was the catalyst for a

large increase in bilateral trade actions. The presidency, which has traditionally withstood

protectionist calls, was badly weakened after Watergate.16 Moreover, many industries
were weakened during the relatively poor economy of the 1970s. One opportunity to
protect your hurting industry is to prevent trade, fair or unfair.

In 1979, Section 301 was mildly strengthened. Then, in 1984, explicit statutory
definitions were given to the terms unreasonable, unjustifiable, and discriminatory in
Section 301. Also, the definition of standing was loosened so that more businesses could
bring unfair trade claims. Section 301 was also made more favorable to claimants when

the rules relating to antidumping and countervailing duties (CVDs) were changed to favor
claimants.17

Some supporters of Section 301 have argued that it diverts protectionist senti

ments away from closing our market and to opening foreign markets. There are many

problems with this argument. First of all, if a Section 301 dispute is successful when it
should not have been, then the focus is closing our market because some type of reaction,
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such as antidumping duties, will occur.18
Another problem with this argument is that Section 301 operates outside of the
multilateral trading order. The United States appoints itselfjudge, jury, and executioner
when it performs a Section 301 investigation. Not only does this circumvent the WTO,

but it also makes it looks like the United States is appointing itself the good guys to take

on the foreign bad guys.19 Many countries resist this because of our own sins against free
trade. Japan and Korea will likely be especially angered by this. These two countries

accounted for only 17% of Section 301 investigations, but were responsible for one-half
of all successful outcomes. Whether these results are justified or not, they make these two

countries feel like they are being unfairly singled out by the United States.20
In almost every unfair trade case, the US government finds the foreigners at fault.
One element of the Uruguay Round of GATT stated that there was an "undertaking not to
make unilateral determinations about the GATT-consistency of other countries' policies."
This provision was directed at Section 301 and certainly made it harder to defend its

continued use.21 However, such actions were inconsistent with the Tokyo Round, as well,
so the United States is likely to continue to use Section 301, or some similar variant of
it.22

An even more aggressively unilateral trade law is Super 301. Super 301 makes the

United States Trade Representative (USTR) submit an annual report to Congress on
evidence of substantial progress towards eliminating unfair trade practices. Super 301 was

taken off the books in 1990, but was reinstated in 1994 by President Bill Clinton. Super
301 tested the limits of Japanese responsiveness to unilateral threats. Rather than be put
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on the "watch" or "priority" lists of Super 301, Japan was put into the broader Structural

Impediments Initiative (SII).23 True, Super 301 is unilateral and illegal under the WTO.
However, until the multilateral trading order addresses competition law we must have
some way to help American businesses. Super 301 is one way to accomplish this. If
Japanese unfair trade is not covered in the WTO, but American unfair trade is covered,
there will be growing frustration with the trading order among American businesses.
In 1995 the United States had a dispute with Japan over auto parts. Those offic

ials opposed to the WTO were likely pleased by the way this case played out. The United

States alleged that Japan has kept out American auto parts by its use of cartel-like dealings
and business-government collusion (i.e. the competition policy we have discussed.) If the

United States imposes retaliatory tariffs, and Japan brings suit underthe WTO, Japan will

win because such US actions are clearly illegal under the WTO. 24
The Trade Act of 1974 included an escape clause to protect domestic industries

from "fair, but injurious" foreign competition. Such filings are known as Section 201
trade cases. During the 1980sthe United States alone processed about 350 unfair trade
cases. However, Section 201 was only used for 26 cases from January 1958 until March

1987.25 In fact, Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-South Carolina), reportedly said that
"going the 201 route is for suckers." 26
It is very unfortunate that Section 201 is so discouraged. It is inevitable that some
industries will be affected by free trade. The basis of freer trade under the WTO is that

some countries' industries will gain and others will lose. But, in the end, total economic
welfare increases by having free trade. Successful 301 cases lead to retaliations that
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reduce free trade. If the decision to find the foreign company at fault was the "wrong"
decision, then relations will likely sour and we lose the benefits of free trade.

Section 201 is a way to acknowledge that some industries suffer because of free

trade, and we should help these industries. Once an industry demonstrates a successful

201 case, they could receive Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA).27 A simple political
reality lesson can demonstrate why this maybe a beneficial, but unrealistic option. Let us
say that a Section 301 retaliation leads to antidumping duties that raise the costs of
products and decreases consumer welfare by $40 billion. On the other hand, we could

provide $10 billion in assistance to an industry and save $30 billion. The problem is that
the $40 billion is spread out and goes unnoticed, while the $10 billion is visible because it

will have to come from increased taxes, decreased spending, or a higher deficit.

Furthermore, a country initiating a 201 investigation faces a heavy burden to prove
to the ITC that it deserves help. Another benefit of Section 201 is that it gives the money
directly to the industry to change. A Section 301 finding may lead to protection that
merely delays the inevitable collapse of the industry. If we decide that Section 201 is the

preferred route we need to make it easier to prove than Section 301 and Super 30i cases
/u!t£«j!-?iiipiiij^ iiss oecome an increasin^-iv cooiiiioii meiiioQ or ^iroTection
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Michael J. Finger's book entitled Antidumping, he calls this"ordinary protection with a

grand public relations program."28 The Tokyo Round ofGATT turned antidumping into a
major, from a minor, instrument for restricting imports. Soon thereafter, antidumping
became the major means for controlling imports in Australia, Canada, the European
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Community, and the United States. This is quite a testament to the flexibility of

antidumping as a weapon against imports.29
It has been unfortunately rare for the government to ask if a problem is caused by

dumping. Instead, industries ask how antidumping canbe applied to their problem.30 Like
other trade laws on the books in the United States, though, antidumping does serve more
than one purpose. Surprisingly, it is meant to prevent dumping. How- ever, since Section

301 is unlawful under the new WTO, antidumping laws are one of our best ways to
retaliate against closed markets. And until the WTO deals with competition policy, US
industries are likely to continue to use antidumping laws to challenge forms of unfair

competition besides dumping.31
Our current antidumping laws are unpredictable and are often arbitrarily applied. If

a foreign company sets prices too high they will be uncompetitive, if they set prices too

low they may face a costly antidumping suit.32 The countries of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Korea are part of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) which puts limits on apparel exports.
Despite the restriction imposed by the MFA, the USITC still found that these three

countries had dumped sweaters. This makes it painfully clear why other countries would

complain that our antidumping laws restrict imports unfairly.33
Besides antidumping, another common trade law we have applied against Japan is
Countervailing Duties (CVDs). However, the perception is that the WTO put stricter
controls on the use of CVDs, than on the use of antidumping. So we should not be

surprised to see the continued use of antidumping.34
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The United States may not have realized it at the time, but we should be thankful

that Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) were made illegal under the WTO. Before they
were made unlawful, the United States made common use of VERs. When we negotiated
VERs with Japan on automobiles, steel, machine tools, and textiles, we managed to send

economic rents to Japan.35 Not only that, but since VERs required Japan to reduce
output, the industries colluded to decide who would get to export. This enhanced the

powerof the MITI bureaucrats, who set up the industry collusion. This was the opposite

of what we desired, and we should be glad that VERs are a thing of the past.36
American Bilateral Actions Against Japan

Now that we know how the United States retaliates against Japan, we can examine
whether it has been effective or not. Patrick Low wrote that 27 out of 77 Section 301

cases from 1975-1990 had a trade liberalizing effect. It is difficult to measure if the trade

liberalizing effect of this was worth the negative consequences of acting outside of the
WTO.37

If one measure of the effectiveness of unilateral action is the overall liberalizing
effect, then another measure must be which industry is affected. Laura D'Andrea Tyson,
for one, has argued that we must be more aggressive in protecting high-technology
industries. The semiconductorindustry is often mentioned in this regard. Since
semiconductors are a downstream product (a product used by other firms in a finished
product), many have argued that we should simply buy them from the cheapest source.

We should not be angry that Japan is protecting semiconductors, we should be glad that
we are getting a cheap product.
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A similar argument is often made for national defense. The argument is that we

are better off stockpiling and/or buying from the cheapest source rather than propping up
an inefficient industry we deem necessary to the national defense. Finally, despite all the
rhetoric about the need for a high-tech industry, the semiconductor dispute has followed

the same political economy script of other US-Japan trade conflicts.38
It may be true that the dispute follows the same script, but high-tech industries are
different. High-tech exporting companies provide unmeasurable contributions to a

nation's technological capabilities. By sacrificing the industry, a country may sacrifice
these beneficial offshoots.

Bilateral negotiations have worked with Japan in other ways. Before the TRIPs
agreement in the Uruguay Round, we threatened to cut off Japanese access to our market

if they failed to protect our semiconductor patents. Eventually, Japan agreed to a 10-year
protection of chip design. As in all negotiations, though, the threat of increased tensions

must be balanced against actual or potential liberalizing effects.39
A dispute in the mid 1980s demonstrated another reason why bilateral action may
be necessary. At this time, Japanesefirms managed to drive several US producers out of
the market, most of whom did not return. This left the field to six Japanese corporations

who raised prices and raked in profits. These profitswere put back into R&D which gave

the companies a further advantage.40 American downstream users were left paying higher
prices, and 42% of 59 companies interviewed in one study complained about delays in
receiving chips from Japanese producers. Some delays in receiving state-of-the-art chips

were longer than six months.41
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The semiconductor trade agreement (STA) signed in 1986 eliminated competition
among firms and allowed MITI to set up a cartel. This further increased profits. Eventu
ally Japan signed an agreement mandating at least a 20% US share in the Japanese market.
Thus, we had entered the very controversial area of managed trade. Inevitably, some
people argued that this was a laudable step towards increasing sales in Japan. Others
thought that setting a threshold amounted to dangerous tampering with the free market.42

The 1985 recession in the semiconductor industry was severe. It may be possible

to blame unfair Japanese trade for some of the domestic chipmakers' problems. But Japan

experienced similar layoffs and losses to US chip manufacturers.43 It may have been that
the Japanese system of capitalism allowed the semiconductor firms to weather the storm,

and sell at or near marginal cost for a longer time. Or, it may have been that Japanese
firms were dumping chips and blocking imported chips. The record seems to indicate that
all of these were taking place.

To this day, trade analysts are still unsure how to measure the affects of the

semiconductor dispute on domestic industries. The record of the Cray corporation case

seems to indicate that the Japanese were more at fault in supercomputers. Cray
supercomputers are consistently ranked the best in the world. In the late 1980sthey held
an estimated 63% of the world market: 84% of the European market, 81% of the North

American market, and only 15% of the Japanese market. Japanese companies held 85% of
the Japanese market and 10% of the European market.44
These numbers are hard to justify by anything except the infant-industry argument.
Eventually, the Japanese did open their market to supercomputers, but onlywhen
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domestic producers were strong enough to compete. But by then, Cray had lost
approximately $400 million in revenue and $54 million in extra research and develop

ment.45 Was Japan justified in its intervention. If not, what should we have done?
Steel, on the other hand, provides an example of why not to intervene. In the
1970s steel was experiencing a downward demand on pressure. If you can excuse the
pun, the steel industry benefited from a "steel" triangle of producers, workers, and poli

ticians who worked for import protection; steel has been the most common petitioner in
antidumping and CVD cases. In fact, the steel industry filed such a flurry of antidumping
cases in the 1980s that the government was forced to negotiate VERs because it could not

process the cases intime to meet statutory deadlines.46
By the late 1980s the steel industry experienced a comeback. This comeback was
held up as proof of the voluntary restraint agreement's success. In reality, the steel
industry improved its standing because of successful minimills and other restructuring

programs.47 Thus, the steel case demonstrated a potential pitfall in analyzing trade policy:
confusing cause-and-effect. Just because a retaliatory action preceded an industry's
improvement does not mean that the action caused the comeback; it may have been other
factors. The semiconductor case was really complex in this respect. The managed trade

and retaliatory tariff may have led to a revival in the semiconductor industry, or it may
have simply been changes in the industry itself. For instance, many firms came back into a

niche market where they enjoyed greater price markups.48
Regional Blocs

Europe has been in the process of integration since the end of World War II.
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But since the end of the Cold War, we have also seen the United States grow closer to the
Western Hemisphere, and we have even seen Japan grow closer to the Far East. Before

the Cold War, the GATT members were united in their military opposition against the

Soviet threat. It was a natural offshoot that they would be economic allies.49 A very
pessimistic analysis of the situation could lead one to believe that the GATT merely
codified the pre-existing anti-Soviet situation. Of course, economic gain and friendlier ties
among nations surely played a large part. But it would be difficult to argue that the Cold
War alliance did not help the process along. The new question is will the end of the Cold
War alliance, and the rise in regionalism threaten the multilateral trading order.
Article XXIV of the WTO, dealing with customs unions and free trade areas, is of

minimal significance. With the growth of importance in regional trading blocs, and the
uncertainty about countries not meeting their WTO obligations because of possible

regional discrimination, there will likely be future negotiations inthis area.50
Since the EU is the most advanced of the regional blocs, it will set the tone for the
affect of regional integration on the world trading order. The United States would suffer
the most from a trilateral trade war because it has a greater percentage of trade outside its
bloc.51

The potential for closer Japanese ties with Asia is an interesting case. Since World
War II, the countries of East Asia have feared a Japan that tries to impose hegemony over
the area. However, Japan has become an increasingly critical source of capital and
technology to the NICs of East Asia. In fact, the prime ministers of Thailand and
Malaysia have expressed support for a stronger Japanese role. America's actions will play
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a critical role in how East Asia reacts to a stronger Japanese presence. The NICs may

grow closer to Japan ifthey become annoyed with American foreign economic policies.52
And, Japan may turn inward to the APEC if they feel they are being unfairly targeted by

US trade policy.53 Akey question will be whether the regional blocs provide an example
and incentive on how freer trade leads to economic growth, or whether the regional

organizations will discriminate against those countries not within their bloc.54
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Chapter 4: Policy Proposals
When we choose to impose retaliatory tariffs or antidumping duties, we are raising
the price of an import. It is absolutely critical that we pick the right battles. One way to
do this is to separate parochial interest from national interests. Granted, it is hard to

define the national interest, but we should still avoid parochial interests dictating our trade
policy. For instance, angering the Japanese to appease California rice growers when Thai

rice growers would benefit from a liberalized Japanese rice market is not a wise strategy.1
One way to make sure that national interests are taken into consideration is to consider

downstream users of products. Since downstream users are, by nature, more dispersed
than the initial makers of a product, they are less likely to be politically successful in their
attempts to prevent protection. When an individual industry initiates an antidumping or
Section 301 investigation, the government should be required to consider the interests of
downstream users.

Of 16 industries granted relief from 1954-1988 only the bicycle industry grew.2
These unsuccessful results may have been caused by reliefcoming too late, or it may have
resulted because the relieffailed to open the Japanese market. However, in most cases, it

was probably caused by loss of national advantage in an industry. Attempts to use man
aged trade to turn around the fortunes of industry that is failing for reasons other than un

fair trade will cause a downward spiral as lack of gains lead to calls for more protection.3
What, then, should be the industries we protect. Some industries are bound to

stick out. For instance, the numbers we examined in Chapter 3 about Cray's success in all
markets except Japan demonstrated that they were more than likely being treated unfairly.
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Onetrade analyst divided conflicts into two types. Automobiles and steel fall into the

category of industries facing stiffimport competition. He placed computers,

telecommunications, construction, retailing, and financial services into the category of
industries seeking access to a restricted Japanese market. He said that the semiconductor

industry could be placed into either category.4
Once we decide whether to proceed with a retaliatory trade action, we must decide

how to act. Libertarians would argue that we should not act at all. The Japanese will not
save as much because the population is aging, and Japanese consumers are unlikely to

continue to accept their current lot.5 Libertarians would also argue that we should not use
CVDs to retaliate against unfair subsidization. In fact, we should consider foreign

subsidies a gift that brings lower prices and new technological information free of charge.
Finally, even if you believe that it is advantageous to pick industries to protect or

subsidize, you may question our government's ability to do this effectively.6
Most policymakers are moderate free traders, though. They grudgingly accept

that unilateral action is sometimes necessary.7 In the case studies we looked at for the
Japanese market we saw some examples of where trade intervention is beneficial, but we

also saw where it can be self-destructive. There is some evidence that investment capital
is not made available in certain product areas, like computer displays, if investors believe it

is a market that the Japanese are planning to target.8 Japan is also very protective ofits
own technology while obtaining bargain price licenses for foreign technology.9 Therefore,
even if no industry gains from unilateral action, future industries maygain from the overall
liberalizing affect our actions have on Japan.
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Tothis end, the first major dispute between Japan and the United States involving
the new WTO, provide some evidence, albeit limited, on the effectiveness of unilateral

actions. As we have mentioned, the new WTO has a dispute resolution mechanism.
However, many American trade analysts are opposed to this dispute resolution mechanism

because the WTO does not ban Japan's discriminatory competition policy, but the WTO

does disallow America's ability to unilaterally retaliate against such actions.10
In 1995, a little over a year after the ratification of the Uruguay Round of GATT,

the United States threatened to impose high tariffs on Japanese luxury cars. Tokyo
planned to take the US to the WTO for this unilateral action, and the US planned to go to

the WTO to protest Japanese practices that keep out US auto parts.11 OnJune 28, twelve
hours before the threatened tariffs were to go into affect, this potential trade war was

averted. Even President Clinton mentioned these threatened tariffs in his explanation of

how a compromise was reached.12
We have seenthat sometimes Japan will allow one firm into the oligopoly to have
an example of foreign success. If we have only one or two firms in a market (as in fiber

optics or supercomputers), we should accept this. But we should attempt to achieve

complete liberalization when there are several firms in an industry.13
We should always keep our eye on free trade and the multilateral trading order.
Free trade promotes economic expansion and good will among nations. A large focus of
this paper has been on competition policy. Although competition policy has not been dealt

within the WTO, we should have cooperative investigation and prosecution with Japan
against restrictive trade practices. This will promote good will, begin the process of
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harmonizing competition policies, and, hopefully, lead to some sort of multilateral

agreement in the near future.14
Changing Japan

The events of the past four years seemto indicate that Japan's best interest lie in
opening its market. The 1995 Japanese elections were a rejection of the candidates who

symbolized work, accumulation, and progress.15 Also, but slowly, the Japanese govern
ment is changing. By the end of the 1980s, Japanese ministries were pressuring businesses

to permit more imports. This symbolized that the Japanese government was focusing on

the competition policy problems that have kept out imports.16
In this essayI have said that our interests lie with the multilateral trading order.
However, I have also emphasized the benefits that can come from acting bilaterally.
This may not be a popular position with many economists, but the nature of our relations

demonstrate that we can help nudge Japan towards opening up its markets.

Gaiatsu is the Japanese term used to describe the process of foreign pressure
acting to overcome political inaction and reluctance to liberalize. In April 1993 Prime

Minister Kiichi Miyazawa explicitly asked Bill Clinton to apply pressure to get Japan to

liberalize.17 Since World War II, Japan has looked to America for leadership. This is a
delicate game, though. If we push to hard we end up looking lazy and self-righteous. If
we do not push hard enough, Japan may not change.

There are many reasons to fear that Japan will not change. Noted Japanologist

Chalmers Johnson once noted that "preoccupation with balance-of-payments problems

runs through Japan's modern history like a litany."18 Whether or not, Japan can put forth a
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concerted effort to contain their trade surplus is uncertain. There is no real center of

power in Japan so decisions are made by a slow consensus. Not only that, but there are
close social bonds between buyers and sellers, a strong sense of hierarchy, and a feeling

that Japan must be protected from foreign products.19
The dynamics of group-centered decision-making, which Japan demonstrates,

leads to slow change, and means that sharp breaks with history are rare, even if they are
very necessary. We just saw that the Japanese government has been pressuring

businesses to accept more imports. However, one government document stated that
"Japan must become a leading importer of manufactured goods in order tofulfill its

obligation toward the international community"21 (author's emphasis). Thus far, action
has lagged behind the rhetoric of greater openness, but the fact they are talking is good.

After all, their decision-making process dictates that they will move slowly.22
In the end it may be economics that provides the final push. The closed Japanese
system prevents companies from purchasing the lowest priced inputs for their products.

Japan may be able to import from its own companies stationed abroad, but that is simply
not as beneficial as being able to purchase products from the cheapest source. Thus far,
Japan has been able to use domestically produced imports because the worker's incomes

have been kept low. Japanese workers are unlikely to allow this much longer.
MITI has set the stage for Japanese industry by producing its 10-year "vision
documents" at the beginning of each decade. The 1990 "vision document", which

included groundbreaking issues such as improving the quality of life, scarcely mentioned
individual industries.23
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The recent renewed downturn in the Japanese economy may provide another
impetus for change. But the complex relationship between business and industry will be
difficult to dismantle. The CEO of Itochu Corp., a Japanese trading company, said that

"radical reform in Japan is really going to take many years."24
Conclusion

Although we may benefit from free trade, it can be necessaryto deviate from a

laissez-faire view of world trade. By applying pressure on the Japanese to open up its
market, we may be able to help them overcome cultural and political obstacles to free
trade. Though the WTO has been an important component towards freer trade, the fact
that it currently does not deal with competition policy means that it will fall short of
tackling some of the points of conflict between Japan and the United States. These
obstacles are causing unnecessary hardship on the Japanese consumer, and some American
producers; unilateral action may be necessary to overcome them.

The lessons we learn from our dealings with Japan should not be forgotten, either.
The Japanese were successful in transforming itself into a modern country. Its method of
acheiving this success will likely be emulated by other countries. We should remember
what has and has not worked with Japan when forming trade policy with these other
countries.

1Regulating Unfair Trade, 1993, p. 65.

2Bid, p. 64. Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries, 1992, p. 280
3Trading Free, 1993, p. 145.

4Reconcilable Differences: United States-Japan Economic Conflict, 1993, p. 190.
5Regulating Unfair Trade, 1993, p. 138.
6Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries, 1993, p. 13.
7Bid, p. 10.
8Bid, p. 276.
9The New Protectionist Wave, 1990, p. 94.
10 Business Week, December 30, 1996, p. 26.

47

11 Business Week, June 5, 1995, p. 35.
12 Working Paper Series, July 1996, p. 2.
13 Reconcilable Differences: United States-Japan Economic Conflict, 1993, p. 193.
14 Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries, 1992, p. 280.
15 The Emptiness ofJapanese Influence, 1996, p. 18.
16 Regulating Unfair Trade, 1993, p. 43.
17 Reconcilable Differences: United States-Japan Economic Conflict, 1993, p. 231.
18 Japan's Emerging Global Role, 1993, p. 6.
19 Japan's Unequal Trade, 1990, pp. 99-100.
20 Bid, 1990, p. 98
21 Bid, 1990, p. 111.
22 Ibid.

23 Management Today, January 1995, p. 47.
24 Business Week, December 16, 1996, p. 49.

Works Cited
Altschiller, Donald, (ed). Free Trade vs. Protectionism. New York: The H.W. Wilson
Company, 1988.

Bergstren, C. Fred, & Noland, Marcus. Reconciliable Differences: UnitedStatesJapan Economic Conflict. Washington DC: Institute for International
Economics, 1993.

Borrus, Amy, & Javetski, Bill. "Who's Afraid ofthe World Trade Organization?"
Business Week, June 5, 1995, p. 35.

Bremner, Brian, Glasgall, William, & Galuszka, Peter. "Two Japans." Business Week,
January 27, 1997, pp. 24-28.

Bremner, Brian, & Takahashi, Tomoko. "Is Japan Headed for Another Recession?"
Business Week, December 16, 1996, pp.48-49.

Cohen, Stephen D., Paul, Joel R, & Blecker, Robert A. Fundamentals of US Foreign
Trade Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.

Collins, Susan M., & Bosworth, Barry P., (eds). The New GATT. Washington DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1994.

Copplestone, George. "MITI Cuts Japan Loose." Management Today, January 1995,
pp. 44-47.

Einhorn, Bruce, Borrus, Amy, & Echikson, William. "Why the WTO is Stuck in the
Muck." Business Week, December 16, 1996, p. 50.

Finger, J. Michael. Antidumping. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993.
Grilli, Enzo, & Sassoon, Enrico, (eds). The New Protectionist Wave. New York:
New York University Press, 1990.

Krishna, Kala, & Morgan, John. "Implementing Results-Oriented Trade Policies: The
Case ofthe US/Japanese Auto Parts Dispute." Working PaperSeries. Cam
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Working Paper 5680,
July 1996.

Krueger, Anne O. American Trade Policy: A Tragedy in the Making. Washington DC.
The AEI Press, 1995.

Krueger, Anne O, (ed.) The Political Economy ofAmerican Trade Policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Kuttner, Robert. "How Clinton's Trade Policy Hamstrings America." Business Week,
December 30, 1996, p. 26.
Lincoln, Edward J. Japan's Unequal Trade. Washington DC: The Brookings Institu
tion, 1993.

Low, Patrick. Trading Free. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993.

McCormack, Gavan. The Emptiness ofJapanese Influence. New York: ME. Sharpe,
Inc., 1996.

Magnusson, Paul. "Building Free Trade Bloc By Bloc." Business Week, May 25, 1992,
pp. 26-27.
Moyer, Homer E., Jr. "How Will the Uruguay Round Change the Practice of Trade Law
in the United States?" Journal of World Trade, June 1996, pp. 63-85.

Nivola, Pietro S. Regulating Unfair Trade. Washington DC: The Brookings Institu
tion, 1993.

Ozaki, Robert. Human Capitalism. New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 1991.
"Personal Imports on the Rise." Focus Japan, November 1996, pp. 1-2.

Riethmuller, Paul. "Reform ofthe Japanese Food Distribution System: Implications for
Consumers." Journal ofConsumer Policy, Vol. 19, 1996, pp. 69-82.

Talbott, Strobe. "Beware ofthe Three-Way Split." Time, June 15, 1992, p. 46.
Tyson, Laura D'Andrea. Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology
Industries. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993.
Unger, Danny, & Blackburn, Paul, (eds.) Japan's Emerging Global Role. Boulder
and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993.

Web site: http://wvvw.jetro.go.jp/FACTS/UA-HANDBOOK/13.htrnl.

